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We show that contract-intensive industries particularly thrive both in coun-
tries with high initial level of 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levels of risk and transaction costs. Our empirical results thus conrm the theo-
retical claim that nance promotes real economy via managing risk and decreasing
transaction costs. Furthermore, the pro-growth e¤ect of nance seems to come
from nancial intermediaries like banks rather than from stock markets. This
suggests that the intrinsic functions of relationship-banking (long-term commit-
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important for the contract-intensive industries.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates a possible channel through which nance might a¤ect the real
economy and promote the long-run growth. Specically, we examine whether nancial
development can alleviate problems associated with incomplete contracts and relationship-
specic investments. If a producer requires non-standardized intermediate goods for the
production, the supplier has to undertake ex ante investment in order to customize the
input. The value of such specic input is thus higher inside the buyer-seller relationship
than outside it, resulting in the well-known holdup problem. After the relationship-
specic investment is made, the buyer can refuse to meet her commitment in order to
trigger an ex post re-negotiation. The seller takes the risk of such opportunistic behav-
iour into account when making the investment decision. The consequence is underin-
vestment in the relationship-specic assets. In theory, the producer of the nal good
could agree to sign a detailed binding contract and thereby stimulate the supplier to
undertake the optimal level of relationship-specic investment. In reality, even the most
comprehensive contract remains incomplete as it cannot incorporate all possible states
of world.1 Consequently, written contracts combined with the legal enforcement of state
o¤er only an imperfect remedy for the opportunism risk associated with relationship-
specic investment. Furthermore, the transaction costs of production increase due to
negotiating of sophisticated contracts, not to mention the costs of possible legal enforce-
ment. This is where our paper brings the nancial development into play. After all, the
management of risk and decreasing of transaction costs belong to the main functions of
nance (Levine 2005). Moreover, it is not just the overall level of nancial development
that matters. There are several reasons to expect a pre-eminent role of banking sector
(as opposed to anonymous stock markets) in the promotion of industries with high share
of relationship-specic inputs.
First, even in countries with highly e¤ective legal system, the way through courts is
costly and does not o¤er an absolute guarantee of success. Financial intermediaries like
banks often provide specialized products alongside the loans. Financial instruments such
1The seminal papers on incomplete contracts, relationship-specic investments and the associated
holdup problem include Klein et al. (1978), Williamson (1979), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart
and Moore (1990). Hart (1995) provides an intuitive introduction to this literature. Caballero and
Hammour (1998) is an early work about macroeconomic consequences of relationship specicity and
incomplete contracts.
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as letter of credit o¤er a convenient alternative to the cumbersome route of complicated
contracts and their legal enforcement. Furthermore, the remunerative character of such
accompanying products gives the banks the incentive to acquire deep knowledge about
specic industry in order to better ne-tune its services (Boot and Thakor 2000). In
this context, one could also view the bank loans as contracts that explicitly or implicitly
include relationship-specic investment and long-term commitment between the bank
and client (Boot 2000, Ongena and Smith 1998). Accordingly, several authors (Boot et
al. 1993, Rajan 1998, Rajan 2005) argued that the main comparative advantage of banks
over the public markets or even the very reason for their existence lies in the ability to
o¤er incomplete (or discrete) contracts. This makes the banks especially qualied to
understand the needs and o¤er an appropriate service for the industries distinguished
by the high share of incomplete contracts with their suppliers. Tellingly, the seminal
work on the macroeconomic implications of relationship-specic assets mentions in the
rst paragraph the bank credits and investments of the upstream rms as two examples
of economic specicity (Caballero and Hammour 1998, p. 725).
Second, there is always a residual risk of a "vis major" holdup due to unexpected
economic problems of the buyer. Equipped with detailed written contracts and operating
in country with superior legal enforcement, the suppliers will still face the risk of buyers
unable to meet their nancial commitments. A well-developed banking sector can play
a vital role in reassuring the suppliers that hesitate to undertake irreversible specic
investments. According to Fama (1985), taking a bank loan is a particularly suitable
way to signal the creditworthiness to the business partners. Bank loans have often low
priority among the contracts promising xed payo¤s. The renewal process of short-term
bank loans thus implies a regular assessment of the borrowers ability to meet such
contracts and signals the reliability of the borrower. The other agents with xed payo¤s
(e.g. suppliers) consider those signals to be credible, as the bank backs them with its
own resources. The value of such signals can be seen in the fact that many rms pay
monitoring fees for lines of credit without e¤ectively taking the o¤ered resources (Fama
1985, p. 37).
Third, the credit lines can overcome the short-term bias in investment and lengthen
the rmsplanning horizon (von Thadden 1995). This can be decisive in order to induce
relationship-specic investment. A rm undertaking such investment needs both to
dispose of long-term planning horizon itself and to have business partners that shun
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myopic behaviour.
To sum up, the existence of holdup problem increases the level of risk and transaction
costs while the nancial intermediaries like banks can alleviate some of the associated
problems via the loans and other nancial products. Consequently, a well-developed
nancial (especially banking) system should disproportionately boost industries depen-
dent on the willingness of their business partners to undertake relationship-specic in-
vestments. To test this hypothesis we borrow the notion of contract-intensive (insti-
tutionally intensive) sectors from the recent trade literature on incomplete contracts
and comparative advantage (Nunn 2007, Levchenko 2007). Following Nunn (2007), we
dene contract-intensive industries as sectors using high share of intermediate inputs
that neither can be sold on organized exchange, nor are reference-priced in trade pub-
lications. The intuition behind this empirical proxy for the severity of holdup problem
is simple. The non-existence of organized exchange or even reference price mean that
the seller might have hard time to realize her product at the original price should the
initial buyer refuse to pay.
In the main part of the paper we examine the international data and show that
contract-intensive industries grow faster in countries with high initial level of nancial
development. We also provide evidence that this e¤ect comes from banking sector rather
than from stock market. To control for the potential endogeneity of the nancial de-
velopment, we rely on the GMM estimation and use the countrieslegal origins as the
instrumental variables. The e¤ect of the banking sector on the economic performance
of contract-intensive industries remains positive and signicant. Next, we closer inves-
tigate the mechanism through which the banks promote the sectors with high share of
relationship-specic inputs. We nd that our channel works mostly via extensive mar-
gin (entry of new rms) and capital accumulation. There is somewhat weaker evidence
that the banks boost employment in the contract-intensive industries. Those empirical
results are consistent with the theoretical channels outlined above. It is especially new
rms that need to signal their creditworthiness in order to stimulate relationship-specic
investment of their business partners. Existing rms have already established a repu-
tation with the suppliers and do not depend so much on the signals from third parties
like banks. Similarly, the decrease of the short-term investment bias and increase of
the planning horizon should manifest themselves rst and foremost in the rmscapital
accumulation.
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As an additional test, we also look at the process of branch deregulation in the
USA and examine its consequences for the contract-intensive industries. Starting with
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), an inuential strand of nance-growth literature utilizes
the fact that since 1970s most of the US states started to remove regulations constraining
intrastate branching.2 The branch deregulation o¤ers a unique natural experiment as
it occurred in di¤erent states at di¤erent points of time. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)
control for state and time xed e¤ects and show that the GDP growth in an average
US state accelerates after it relaxes restriction on intrastate branching. To the extent
that deregulation leads to more competitive and e¢ cient banking industry, this result
provides support for the existence of a causal link between nance and economic growth.
We extend the existing work on branch deregulation and show that its pro-growth e¤ects
arise, inter alia, from the promotion of contract-intensive industries.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature.
First, it provides evidence for a novel channel through which nance might a¤ect the
real economy. The question whether nancial development promotes growth or merely
follows the real economy goes back at least to Schumpeter (1912) and Robinson (1952)
and might be the crucial one in the whole nance-growth literature. The argument
over causality can be best solved by documenting a specic mechanism through which
nance a¤ects economic growth. Intuitively, the researcher identies a set of industries
that are especially dependent on some aspect of nance and shows that those industries
grow faster in countries characterized by high level of nancial development. Since the
seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) the search for such mechanism has focused
on the industries that dont generate enough cash-ow and are therefore dependent
on external nance. In other words, the nance-growth literature has placed special
emphasis on the role of nancial development in relaxing the credit constraints in the
real economy. We look instead at industries that rely on banks as the source of risk
management and decrease of transaction costs rather than depending on the nancial
system as a liquidity provider.
2At the beginning of the 1970s the large majority of the US states restricted the geographical scope of
the banking operations, even within their own borders. In the 1970s those states started to allow bank
holding companies to consolidate their bank subsidiaries into branches (M&A branch deregulation) and
to permit de novo branching statewide. The deregulation of de novo branching occurred either at the
same time or somewhat later than the M&A branch deregulation. For a review of this literature see
Strahan (2003).
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Second, the story in this paper is complementary to the idea pursued in the recent lit-
erature on trade and incomplete contracts. Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) show that
the export performance of the contract-intensive industries is stronger in the countries
characterized by good institutions, especially in form of e¤ective contract enforcement.
The notion that well-functioning contract enforcement leads to more relationship-specic
investment is undoubtedly a plausible one. This paper shows that the domestic nancial
system plays an autonomous and equally important role in reducing the costs associated
with incomplete contracts and holdup problem. Even in a country with superior insti-
tutions and perfect contract enforcement, the suppliers will still value good reputation,
long-term planning horizon and nancial stability of the purchasers. As long as nancial
intermediaries like banks can help to provide those, there will be an independent role
for nancial development in promoting the contract-intensive industries. The current
nancial crisis made this point painfully clear. In di¢ cult times even the most e¤ective
contract enforcement might fail to protect the suppliers if the buyer cannot rely on a
reliable source of nancing. To put things simple, no level of institutional quality can
protect the producers of specic inputs intended for the big US car companies. Only
the nancial stabilization of their troubled customers would do the trick.
Finally, the last part of the paper contributes to the literature documenting the
acceleration in growth rates of the US states after the removing of restrictions on the
intrastate branching. This body of empirical work belongs to the most inuential in the
nance-growth literature, but is not free of controversy. The main argument contesting
the positive e¤ects of branch deregulation states that the resulting bank consolidation
could hurt the rms relying on the relationship lending. The theoretical and empirical
work on this issue has focused on the e¤ects of branch deregulation on small and/or
new enterprises that traditionally depend on relationship banking.3 By looking at the
contract-intensive industries our paper examines an alternative set of bank-dependent
rms and provides some evidence for the benign view of branch deregulation.
3Black and Strahan (2002) provide a good overview of the controversy regarding the e¤ects of bank
consolidation on relationship lending.
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2 Methodology and data
2.1 Empirical model
Our empirical model is based on the methodology introduced by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and then extensively used in the empirical literature examining the e¤ects of
nancial development on economic growth. In their seminal contribution, Rajan and
Zingales handle the endogeneity issue that is at the core of the nance-growth nexus and
couldnt be solved in a satisfactory way by the previous cross-country growth studies.
In the rst step they focus on a specic theoretical mechanism through which nance
promotes economic growth and identify industries that disproportionately rely on this
mechanism. In the second step they show that those industries indeed prot from
nancial development more than the others. Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine the
role of nance in providing external liquidity to rms. Our focus is instead on the use
of nance in managing risks and decreasing the transaction costs.
Specically, we estimate the following equation:
Gic = + FDc0  CIi + Xic + i + c + "ic (1)
where the subscript c and i indicates country and industry respectively and the
subscript 0 indicates beginning of the period variables. As a dependent variable we
use several proxies for industrial growth: average growth of output, average growth of
number of establishments, average growth of output per establishment, average growth
of employment, average growth of capital stock and average growth of TFP. Our main
variable of interest is CIi  FDc0 , where FDc0 is the initial nancial development in
country c and CIi is the contract intensity measure introduced by Nunn (2007). Xic is
a vector of controls and i and c are industry and country dummies that take care of
wide range of omitted variables.
It is important to emphasize the fact that the industry characteristic CIi is com-
puted solely from the US industrial data. This approach is based on two assumptions.
First, assuming that the U.S. markets are well functioning and (relatively) frictionless,
equilibrium variables in the US can be taken as good proxies for exogenous technological
characteristics of the production process in a given industry. Second, as long as the rel-
ative ranking of industry characteristics are the same across countries, the technological
characteristics of the U.S. industries are representative of technologies used in the other
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countries. Those assumptions allow for causal interpretation of estimated coe¢ cients
on the interaction terms of country and industry characteristics.
A positive coe¢ cient of our main variable of interest, CIi  FDc0, indicates that
contract-intensive industries benet on average more from a countrys nancial develop-
ment. The e¤ect of nancial development on contract-intensive industries could occur
via two possible channels. The domestic nancial institutions facilitate the contract-
ing between intermediate goods suppliers and nal goods producers by managing risks
and decreasing the transaction costs. At the same time, the lending relationship with
well established nancial institutions can enhance the planning horizon of the rm and
provide positive reputation signals to its suppliers and customers.
The control variables include the beginning of the period share of the sector in total
output and two interaction terms capturing the alternative channels already documented
in the literature. Assuming that development of nancial system benets from the good
contracting environment, the interaction term of nancial development with contract
intensity might capture the e¤ect of good contracting institution on contract-intensive
industries. Thus, we include in our regression the interaction term of rule of law with
contract intensity (Nunn 2007) to distinguish between these two di¤erent e¤ects. In the
same spirit, we include an interaction term of index of external nance dependence and
nancial development to control for the accentuated e¤ect of nancial development on
industries dependent on the external nance (Rajan and Zingales 1998).
An important point in this econometric approach is the potential endogeneity of
country characteristics like nancial development. We use two di¤erent approaches to
tackle this issue. First, we employ the instrumental variable estimation. Second, we
leave the cross-country framework and make use of the natural experiment in the form
of branch deregulation in the United States.
In the instrumental variable approach we follow the nance-growth literature and
employ the legal origin of countries as instrumental variable. La Porta et al. (1998,
1999) show that the origin of legal system of a country is a strong predictor of its -
nancial development. We instrument the interaction terms of nancial development and
industry characteristics (contract intensity measure of Nunn or external nance depen-
dence measure of Rajan and Zingales) by the interaction terms of the latter variables
with legal origin dummies.4
4We run also estimation with malaria risk from Sachs and Malaney (2002) as additional instrument.
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Our database has complex structure with both country and industry dimensions
where heteroskedasticity might be present. If heteroskedasticity is present, the GMM
estimator is more e¢ cient than simple IV estimator, whereas if heteroskedasticity is not
present, the GMM estimator is no worse asymptotically than IV estimator.5 However,
the optimal weighting matrix that is used in e¢ cient GMM procedure is a function of
fourth moments. Obtaining reasonable estimate of fourth moments requires large sample
size. As result, the e¢ cient GMM estimator can have poor small sample properties.
If in fact the error is homoskedastic, IV would be preferable to e¢ cient GMM in small
sample. Even though our sample has moderate size, we perform a heteroskedasticity
test proposed by Pagan and Hall (1983). Anticipating our results, the Pagan-Hall test
conducted for our main specication rejects null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity at
1% level, therefore in our analysis we rely on GMM estimation 6
The quasi-experimental approach o¤ers another way to tackle the endogeneity in
the nance-growth relationship. An inuential body of literature uses the process of
branch deregulation in the United States in order to establish the causality link from
nance to real economy. Before the 1970s, commercial banks in the most of the US
states were limited in the geographical scope of the operations even within the state
borders. In the 1970s the process of deregulation started in many states by removing
rst the restrictions on intrastate branching via merging and acquisition followed by
elimination of the overall restriction on intrastate branching. The staggered timing of
state-level actions to remove branching and interstate banking restrictions creates an
ideal framework to test empirically how these regulatory changes and associated with
them improvements in the banking sector a¤ect real economy. Jayaratne and Strahan
(1996) show that the timing of deregulation was largely independent from the state
output growth. This allows to exploit variation across states and time of the growth
rates of output to evaluate the e¤ect of the deregulation on the specic industries.
We construct the dummy variable equal to one for states permitting intrastate
branching via merging and acquisition and zero otherwise.7 The growth e¤ects of the
The results are qualitatively the same.
5Baum et al. (2003) discuss the advantage of using GMM over 2SLS in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity of the error term.
6We get very similar results using 2SLS estimation.
7Following the literature we drop the year of deregulation from our estimation and observations for
South Dakota and Delaware. Those states have a unique history related to credit card business which
could lead to biased estimates (see e.g. Strahan 2003).
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deregulation on the contract-intensive industries are estimated using the following spec-
ication:
Gist = + Dst  CIi + Xist + i +4+ "ist (2)
where Gist is output growth for the industry i in state s at time t, Dst is a dummy
for the branch deregulation for state s, CIi is the contract intensity measure, Xist is a
set of controls that include initial industry share in total state (manufacturing) output
and the growth rate of gross state product. This specication includes a set of xed
e¤ects 4:
This specication is generalization of di¤erence in di¤erence approach where the
e¤ect of deregulation is estimated as the di¤erence between the change in the growth
of the contract-intensive industry before and after deregulation with the di¤erence in
growth rate for a control group of industries before and after deregulation. The ability
to control for various xed e¤ects is a major advantage of this empirical approach, as
xed e¤ect dummies can potentially control for wide range of omitted variables. The
state xed e¤ects control for time invariant di¤erences in long run growth rates due
to unexplained factors that di¤er across states, the time xed e¤ects control for the
economic shocks that a¤ect whole economy. The use of xed e¤ects becomes especially
powerful in three dimensional panel, which makes it possible to introduce the interacted
xed e¤ects. The state  time e¤ects fully absorb any omitted time-varying country
characteristics, therefore the direct e¤ect of deregulation cannot be recovered when
we include it into regression. However we can still observe the di¤erential impact of
deregulation across industries within the state.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 International sample
The international industry-level data come from the 2004 UNIDO Industrial Statistics
Database which reports data according to the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 classication. We
use data reported in current US dollars and transform them into constant international
dollars using capital and GDP deator from Penn World Table (Heston, Summers, and
Aten, 2002). The resulting sample comprises of data for 28 manufacturing industries in
91 countries for the period between 1980 and 2004. The list of the countries used in our
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sample is reported in Appendix 1.
We construct a cross-sectional panel by averaging variables over period 1980-2004.
The initial industry share is constructed using the earliest available data for industry
share, doing this we expand the sample of the countries since not all countries report
the data for 1980.
The data for nancial development is taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
(2000) database that contains various indicators of nancial development across coun-
tries and over time. In our analysis, we use two proxies for nancial development:
private credit to GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP, the standard proxies for
nancial development used in the empirical literature.
The data for quality of legal institution, the "rule of law", is taken from the database
constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). This variable is the weighted
average of several variables that measure perception of individuals of the e¤ectiveness
and predictability of the contract enforcement in each country. For our analysis we use
the data for 1996 which is the earliest available estimate for this variable.
In order to test our main hypothesis on di¤erentiated impact of nancial devel-
opment across industries, we employ a contract intensity measure proposed by Nunn
(2007), which quanties the importance of relationship-specic investment for di¤erent
industries.
More precisely, the contract intensity variable is the weighted sum of relationship-
specic inputs used for production of nal good, where relation-specicity characteristics
are identied according to Rauch (1999) classication.8 Given that the original measure
of Nunn is reported for I-O 1997 industry classication, we use the measure of contract
intensity from Levchenko (2008) who recomputes contract-intensity measure for 3-digit
ISIC Revision 2 classication. In our estimation we use the strongest denition of
contract intensity which is measure constructed using only inputs that are neither sold
on an organized exchange nor reference priced according to Rauch.
In addition to contract intensity measure, we use the measure of external nance
dependence introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998). The measure of external nance
dependence is dened as capital expenditure minus cash ow divided by capital expen-
diture. Rather than using the external nance dependence measure from Rajan and
8Rauch (1999) classies SITC Rev. 2 industries according to three possible types: di¤erentiated
products, reference priced, or homogeneous goods.
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Zingales (1998) which is calculated for a mix of three-digit and four-digit ISIC industries,
we adopt the measure of external nance dependence used by Klingebiel, Kroszner and
Laeven (2002) who recompute Rajan and Zingales measure for 3 digit ISIC level only.
The proxies for contract intensity and external nance dependence are constructed
using US industry or rm level data. The assumption is that these measures capture
the technological characteristics of the industries which are similar across countries. For
instrumental variable regressions, we rely on the data of legal origin from La Porta et
al. (1998).
In the Appendix A and B we present data sources as well as summary statistics for
the international data we use in our analysis. Appendix C presents correlation matrix
for explanatory variables used in the cross-country context.
2.2.2 Sample of US states
The dates of branch deregulation in di¤erent US states are taken from Strahan (2003).
In the majority of states, bank deregulation occurred in two successive stages. The rst
stage of deregulation happened when the restriction of intrastate branching via merging
and acquisition (M&A) was abandoned, the second stage of deregulation occurred when
overall restrictions on intrastate branching were removed. Since the time span between
these dates is relatively short it is di¢ cult to disentangle their e¤ects. Following the
literature, we focus on the deregulation of M&A branching when constructing the
deregulation dummy.
The data on the Gross State Product for the US states are taken from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, the data are reported according to US SIC industry classication, in
current dollars. We transform the data on gross state product to real dollars equivalent
using states price deator.
We restrict our sample to the period from 1978 till 1992 in accordance with the em-
pirical literature on the bank deregulation in the USA.9 Since the data on the contract
intensity are reported using ISIC classication, we apply concordance table that relates
these two industrial classication codes. We aggregate those ISIC categories that corre-
spond to the same industry according to US SIC72 classication using simple averaging
of the contract-intensity measure.10
9The data on quantity index that is used to calculate price deator is available starting from 1977.
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) use data for Gross State Product from 1978-1991
10In general, the US SIC72 has broader industry categories than ISIC Rev2.
12
3 International evidence
3.1 OLS estimation: banks versus stock markets
Table 1 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using OLS. The dependent variable
is an average growth in output for each industry and country. In all specications we
include initial industry share and interaction term of contract intensity measure and
initial level of nancial development proxied by private credit to GDP, which is our
variable of interest. Since in all regressions we include country and industry dummies,
the overall e¤ect of initial nancial development is absorbed by country dummies.
The rst column of Table 1 reports the results of estimation controlling only for our
main variable of interest and initial industry share. This is our baseline specication.
The subsequent columns present the results of regression with an augmented set of ex-
planatory variables. Column 2 reports the results of estimation when controlling for
the interaction term of variable rule of law and contract intensity measure. Country
nancial development might be correlated with country legal and contracting institu-
tions. In such case our main variable of interests would also capture the e¤ect of good
contracting institution on the contract intensive industries. By including the interaction
term of country rule of law and contract intensity into the set of regressors we explicitly
account for the channel discussed by Nunn (2008): the contract intensive industries ben-
et disproportionately from good contracting institution. Column 3 shows the results of
regression when adding the interaction term of measure of external nance dependence
and country nancial development to the set of control. Contract intensive industries
might also be the industries that require external funds to support their operations. If
so, then our main variable of interest would capture the e¤ect of nancial development
on the industries that are external nance dependent. Column 3 of Table 1 presents
result controlling for this alternative hypothesis.
In all above specications our main variable of interest maintains positive and statis-
tically signicant coe¢ cient. Inclusion of additional controls does not a¤ect signicantly
our main variable of interests. On the other hand, the coe¢ cient at interaction terms
of contract intensity and rule of law, of nancial development and measure of external
nance dependence while positive, fail to have statistically signicant e¤ect. These re-
sults support our intuition that it is indeed contract intensive industries which benet
from good nancial system.
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The estimated relationship between nancial development and contract intensity, in
addition to being statistically signicant is also economically meaningful. According to
the estimate from the rst column of Table 1, if Mexicos bank credit to GDP increases
to the OECDaverage, then the growth in manufacturing of "professional & scientic
equipment" would increase by 5%. 11
Next, we would like to investigate which type of nancial development is important
for contract intensive industries. On one hand, country level studies show that both
bank and stock market development have positive e¤ect on long run output growth.
On the other hand, banks can provide specialized services alongside the normal lending
which might be benecial for contract intensive industries.
In order to answer this question we add another proxy of nancial development into
our main specication regression. Columns 4-6 report results of regression where we add
interactions terms of stock market capitalization to GDP with industry characteristics
into the set of explanatory variables. Our main variable of interest is robust to the
inclusion of additional controls, i.e. the coe¢ cient at interaction term of private credit
to GDP remains positive and statistically signicant at 1% level. The interaction term
of the stock market capitalization to GDP with contract intensity measure while posi-
tive, fails to enter signicantly into regression. This result conrms our intuition, that
nancial intermediaries provide rms with specic services like improved reputation or
enhanced planning horizon which are important for the contract-intensive sectors and
cannot be provided by anonymous stock markets.12
3.2 Instrumental variable Estimation
The results of the OLS regression cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of our main
hypothesis due to number of reasons. First, due to reverse causality from economic
growth to nancial development. Focusing at industry level data might mitigate the
problem but does not eliminate it totally. Second, our regression equation can have
omitted variable which may seriously contaminate the estimation results.
11This is calculated as follows. Mexicos ratio of private credit to GDP is 0.16 and OECD average is
0.532. The coe¢ cient at the interaction term is 0.169. If Mexicos nancial development reaches the
level of OECD average, then the growth rate in the "professional and scientic equipment" industry
will increase by:   4pcrdGDP  CI = 0:169:  (0:532  0:169)  0:785  5%
12We also run estimations with other proxies for nancial development such as stock market turnover
or stock value traded. These results are available upon request.
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La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) suggest that the origin of legal system of a country
is a strong predictor of a countrys nancial development. We instrument the interac-
tion variables of nancial development (proxied by private credit to GDP) and industry
characteristics (contract intensity measure of Nunn or external nance dependence mea-
sure of Rajan and Zingales) by the interaction terms of later variables with legal origin
dummies.
Table 2 presents results of GMM estimation of the equation (1). The rst three
columns are identical to the rst 3 columns from the Table 1. The coe¢ cient at the
interaction term of contract intensity measure and private credit to GDP remains pos-
itive and signicant at least at 5% level in all three specications. The coe¢ cient at
the interaction term of rule of law and contract intensity now becomes signicant at 5%
level, suggesting that contract-intensive industries benets from both legal and nan-
cial developments. The interaction term of external nance dependence and nancial
development remains positive but insignicant after instrumentation.
While for the second and third specications the coe¢ cients at our variable of interest
decrease in size and become less signicant after instrumentation, for the rst specica-
tion the magnitude of the coe¢ cient increases in comparison with OLS estimates. We
address this result later when discussing the Hansen and Sargan test.
In the lower part of Table 2, we report weak instrument test suggested by Stock and
Yogo (2002), partial R squared measure suggested by Shea (1997) as well as Hansen/
Sargan test of overindentifying restrictions.
The rst stage regression results suggest that our excluded instruments are highly
correlated with the endogenous variables. The F statistics from the rst stage regressions
is around 26, which is above the rule of thumb value of 10 proposed by Yogo and Stock
for weak instrument test in the presence of one endogenous variable. The Cragg-Donald
statistic which is suggested by Stock and Yogo in the presence of several endogenous
regressors in the regression is also reported. 13 Both tests reject the null hypothesis of
weak instruments.
The Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions checks the validity of the
instruments. The null hypothesis is that instruments are uncorrelated with error term.
The Sargan/Hansen test rejects null hypothesis at 10% level of signicance in two out
13The critical values of the Cragg-Donald statistics is tabulated in the Appendix D for the sake of
saving space.
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of three specications.14 A rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the instruments
do not satisfy the required orthogonality conditions either because they are not truly
exogenous or because they are incorrectly excluded from the regression. The ination of
the coe¢ cient at our main variable after instrumentation, reported in column 1 of Table
2, is an additional indication of the problem we might have with our set of instruments.
La Porta et al. (2002) recognize that legal origin can inuence di¤erent spheres of
economic and political life of the country which makes them dangerous to use as instru-
ments. We try to mitigate this problem by adding additional controls in our specication
to account for alternative channels through which legal origin can a¤ect the industry
growth. In particular, we add the interaction terms of industry dummies with log real
income per worker into regression equation. In this way we control for the possibility
that, for reason unrelated to nancial development, high income countries specialize in
certain industries. The results of the estimation are reported in the last three columns
of the Table 2. In all three specications the coe¢ cient of the interaction term of
nancial development and contract intensity remain signicant and positive. Also, the
magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient stays approximately at the same level as in the es-
timations without additional controls. The Hansen/ Sargan statistics clearly improves:
now we cannot reject null hypothesis at 10 % level of signicance in two out of three
specications. The coe¢ cients at the interaction term of rule of law and contract in-
tensity variable as well as at the interaction term of external nance dependence and
nancial development stay positive but insignicant. This result might be indication
of multicollinearity problem when two endogenous variables enter into regression. The
coe¢ cient estimate for interaction term of contract intensity and nancial development
drops in size and loses signicance when we introduce other two interaction variables
into regression. Since the instruments are always interaction variables of industry char-
acteristics (contract intensity or external nance dependence) with legal origins, this
may produce multicollinearity problem when two endogenous variable are instrumented
by similar set of instruments.
14In the specication that includes interaction term of rule of law and contract intensity the null
hypothesis of orthogonality cannot be rejected at 10% level of signicance.
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3.3 Financial Development and the Channels to Economic Growth
The industry can grow either because new establishments are being created or because
existing establishments increase in size or both. In order to investigate which component
of the overall growth benets from nancial development, we run separate regression for
each of its components.
Table 3 and 4 report the results where dependent variable is the average growth per
establishment and the average growth in number of establishments respectively. The
rst three columns present the OLS regressions, the next three present baseline GMM
estimation and the last three columns of the tables report the results of GMM estimation
including into specications the interaction terms of industry dummies and GDP per
worker to control for potential omitted variable bias. In all specications, nancial
development has positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on the growth in number of
establishment while it fails to have statistically signicant e¤ect on the growth in output
per establishment.
These results suggest that nancial development facilitates creation of new rms
in the contract-intensive industries. This is in line with our main intuition: newly
established rms in contract-intensive industries strongly depend on reputation and
long-term planning horizon that come along with bank credits. The rms existing for
a longer period of time usually already possess established network of suppliers and do
not rely so heavily on reputation signals coming from bank loans.
Next, we would like analyze the e¤ect of the nancial development under standard
growth accounting framework. In order to do so, we reconstruct capital stock using
standard methodology employed by Hall and Jones (1999) and TFP using methodology
of Solow (1957). See Appendix D for details.
In the Tables 5 to 7 we present the results of estimation where dependent variable
is growth in capital, growth in employment and TFP growth. Again, the rst three
columns report the OLS estimations, the following three present the results of baseline
GMM estimation and the last three columns report the results of GMM estimation with
augmented set of regressors.
We can see that higher level of nancial development has positive and statistically
signicant impact on the growth rate of capital accumulation for contract-intensive
industries (see columns 4-9, Table 5). The coe¢ cient estimate is signicant at 1% level
but the estimated size of impact is a bit smaller than that we obtained in our main
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specication (see Table 2). This result suggests that nancial development promotes
the long run growth in contract intensive industries by boosting the long run rate of
accumulation of physical capital.
Turning to employment growth, results are ambiguous (see column 4-9, Table 6).
The coe¢ cient of the interaction term of nancial development and contract intensity
while always positive, stays signicant only in the absence of the interaction variable of
external nance dependence measure and nancial development. In sum, we do not nd
robust relationship between nancial development and employment growth in contract
intensive industries.
Finally, Table 7 presents the estimation results with TFP growth as dependent vari-
able. The coe¢ cient at our main variable of interest is not signicant in both OLS and
GMM estimations. The data do not suggest that higher level of nancial development
promotes economic growth via improvements in TFP.
4 Evidence from US Branch Deregulation
The analysis based on the international data suggests that nancial development par-
ticularly promotes the contract-intensive industries. In order to further investigate this
issue we check our prediction using the data from the US bank deregulation.
The banking industry experienced signicant changes after branch deregulation. The
banking sector consolidated as large bank holding companies acquired banks and con-
verted existing bank subsidiaries into branches. Small banks lost market share and
regional bank markets experienced signicant entry of new banks. These changes in the
banking sector became the source of improved e¢ ciency of the banking sector. Entry of
new banks and consolidation provided an important selection mechanism to replace less
e¢ cient banks. The formation of larger bank organizations allowed to explore economies
of scale and to gain better diversication via expansion of branch network. The average
costs of intermediation decreased via better loan monitoring and screening. All these
changes translated into overall higher growth of the real sectors of economies (see e.g.
Jayaratne and Strahan 1996, Kroszner and Strahan 1999, Strahan and Black 2002,
Strahan 2003).
As the branch deregulation led not only to more e¢ cient but also to more consol-
idated banking sector, its impact on the contract-intensive industries is theoretically
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ambiguous. The increased quality of surviving banks should benet industries that
heavily depend on the quality of bank services.15 The e¤ect of bank consolidation is
not that clear-cut. On one hand, the contract-intensive industries may rely on specic
long-term relationships with regional banks to decrease their contracting and opera-
tional costs. The knowledge of the industries should allow the local banks to provide
ne-tuned banking services to their customers. The branch deregulation decreases
monopoly power of the local banks and may destroy incentive of the banks to forge long
term relationship with the businesses. Petersen and Rajan (1995) develop the model
where market power of the banks helps new businesses. The monopolistic banks can
subsidize borrowers during some periods because they can extract rents during other
times. In competitive markets, however, rms have access to alternative sources of
credit. Here the banks cannot o¤er low prices early on as they lack the market power
to recover those investments later. On the other hand, Boot and Thakor (2000) argue
that the bank competition may raise the rewards to activities that allow to di¤erentiate
themselves from other lenders, which raise the incentive to invest in relationships with
borrowers. In the same spirit, if the monopolistic banking structures simply result in
lower credit availability and lack of e¢ ciency, then competition results in provision of
better banking services which should benet contract-intensive industries.
The empirical results are mixed as well. Strahan and Black (2002) show that branch
deregulation benets small and young rms that traditionally depend on relationship
lending. They nd that rate of new incorporations in state increased signicantly after
deregulation. Thus, the diversication benets of bank size which reduce delegated mon-
itoring costs, outweigh the possible comparative advantage that small banks may have
in forging long term relationships with small businesses. Ceterelli and Gambera (2001)
show that industries dependent on external nance grow faster in countries with more
concentrated banking system than they do in countries with more open and competitive
banking sector. Similarly to small and new enterprises, the rms in contract-intensive
industries also disproportionately depend on a committed long-term relationship with
15Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) analyze the quality of the banks loans before and after deregulation.
They show that intrastate deregulation improves the quality of the bank loan portfolio. In addition,
they show that quantity of loans granted to "insiders" (corporate executive, principal shareholders)
decreases signicantly after branching reform. The improvement in the bank loan after deregulation
and no consistent increase in lending after branch reform suggest that bank monitoring and screening
improvement are the key to the observed growth increases.
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their bank. In this context a pro-growth e¤ect of branch deregulation on contract-
intensive industries would suggest that bank competition has an overall positive e¤ect
on the relationship lending.
Table 8 presents the estimation results of the equation 2. In all specications we
include the initial share of the industry in state manufacturing output to control for
the convergence e¤ect. Following the literature on branch deregulation, we estimate the
model using ordinary least square (OLS) and weighted least square (WLS) estimation,
with weights proportional to the size of the state economy at the beginning of the period.
We use WLS in order to deal with measurement error which is likely to be greater for
smaller states. In all cases we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
In the rst and fourth column we report the results of OLS and WLS estimation
controlling for time, industry and state xed e¤ects. In both columns the interaction
term of deregulation dummy and contract intensity measure is positive and signicant
at 10%. In the second and fth column we add the growth of state output into the set
of regressors. This controls for the possibility that the timing of deregulation is a¤ected
by economic performance of the state. Our results survive this additional control. Fi-
nally, in third and sixth column we report the results of the regression controlling for
statetime and industry xed e¤ects. The inclusion of the interacted statetime ef-
fects controls for any omitted time-varying state characteristics. The coe¢ cient on our
main variable remains positive and signicant. However, in this specication we cannot
identify the direct e¤ect of branch deregulation on industrial growth, as it is absorbed
by the statetime xed e¤ects.
5 Conclusion
Several prominent papers (Klein et al. 1978, Williamson 1979, Grossman and Hart
1986, Hart and Moore 1990) argue that a rational agent (e.g. upstream supplier) tends
to underinvest in relationship-specic assets due to possible opportunistic behaviour of
her contractual partner (downstream purchaser). The standard proposals to alleviate
the adverse economic consequences of this holdup problem include vertical integration
or legally binding contract between the two parties. The recent trade literature (Nunn
2007, Levchenko 2007) builds upon this insight and demonstrates the benecial e¤ects
of contract-enforcing institutions for the sectors with high share of relationship-specic
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inputs. The empirical results in this paper suggest that nancial development might
be at least equally important for the economic performance of such contract-intensive
industries.16 A well-developed banking sector seems especially important in this regard.
This is not to say, that institutions do not play a potentially important role in the de-
velopment of contract-intensive industries. First, bank products suitable for reassuring
the party undertaking the relationship-specic investment often require a functioning
legal system. Letter of credit would be a primary example. One might thus view in-
stitutional quality and strong banking sector as complements, rather than substitutes.
Second, an inuential strand of literature (e.g. Levine et al. 2000) argues that good in-
stitutions including contract enforcement can boost nancial development. One possible
interpretation of our results could be that the superior institutions promote contract-
intensive industries mostly indirectly via their impact on level of nancial development.
Needless to say, much more work is needed to disentangle the e¤ects of nance and
institutions on the industries using relationship-specic inputs. First, there is an issue
of possible nonlinearities between contract enforcement and nance, briey raised by
Levine et al. (2000). The theoretical literature explains the very existence of nancial
intermediaries as the consequence of market imperfections (e.g. Boyd and Prescott
1986). In a world with perfect contract enforcement, there would be less reason to have
nancial intermediaries on the rst place. Second, a third common factor like culture or
human capital can drive both nancial and institutional development. We leave those
issues for further research.
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Appendix A
The capital stock in each year t is given by:
Kict = (1  )Kict 1 + Iict
We use a depreciation rate  = 0:08, and use the standard assumption that initial
level of capital stock is equal to:
Kic0 =
Iic0

We compute total factor productivity at the industry level using the following for-
mula:
lnTFPict = lnYict   (1  ic) lnKict   ic lnLict
where Yict is the total output, Kict is the capital stock and Lict is the total employ-
ment in the sector.
The ic is computed as the average of the total wage bill divided by value added for
sector i for the US data,17 this will allow us to avoid unduly reduction in our sample to
the countries that have available data for value added and wage payment.
Countries list
Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Bangladesh; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana;
Brazil; Bulgaria; Cameroon; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote dIvoire;
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Ethiopia; Finland;
France; Gabon; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Honduras; Hong Kong; Hungary; Iceland;
India; Indonesia; Iran; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kenya; Korea(republic
of); Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Macao; Malawi; Malaysia; Malta; Mau-
ritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Nepal; Netherlands; New
Zealand; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Por-
tugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Senegal; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; South
Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad &Tobago;
Tunisia; Turkey; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela; Yemen
17Levchenko, Ranciere and Thoening (2008) who use similiar database to analyze the e¤ect of nacial
liberization on industry growth show that results do not change if a countryaverage labor share of
sector i is used instead.
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